Consider concurrent, infinite duration, two-player win/lose games played on graphs. If the winning condition satisfies some simple requirement, the existence of Player 1 winning (finitememory) strategies is equivalent to the existence of winning (finite-memory) strategies in finitely many derived one-player games. Several classical winning conditions satisfy this simple requirement.
Introduction
Computer science models systems interacting concurrently with their environment via infinite duration two-player win/lose games played on graphs: a play starts at a state of the graph, where the players concurrently choose one action each and thus induce the next state, and so on for infinitely many rounds. The winning condition is a given subset W of the infinite sequences of states, and Player 1 wins the play iff the sequence of visited states belongs to W . A strategy of a player prescribes one action depending on what has been played so far, and a winning strategy is a strategy ensuring victory regardless of the opponent strategy.
There are games where neither of the players has a winning strategy, but Borel determinacy [25] guarantees the existence of a winning strategy in games where the players play alternately and the winning condition is a Borel set. Under Borel condition again, Blackwell determinacy [26] guarantees a weaker conclusion when the players play concurrently: there exists a value v ∈ [0, 1] such that for all > 0 the players have stochastic strategies guaranteeing victory with probability v − and 1 − v − , respectively.
In the special case of concurrent games played on finite graphs with ω-regular winning conditions, [11] designed algorithms to decide the existence of (stochastic) strategies that are winning, winning with probability one, and winning with probability 1 − for all > 0.
[11] also mentions a three-state game where only the latter exist, which exemplifies the complexity of the concurrent ω-regular games on finite graphs. Then [6] studied concurrent prefix independent winning conditions, which is strictly more general than the ω-regular conditions, and [13] further improved upon some results. Some of these results were extended recently to multi-player multi-outcome games, see e.g. [3] , [15] .
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Concurrent games and semi-random determinacy To the left, a concurrent game with states q0, q1, colors 0, 1, 2, and two actions per player. To the right, a one-player game derived by using the delayed response [(0, q0) (0, q0) ]; [(1, q0) (2, q1)] 
Definitions
The folklore Observation 1 below will be used extensively to lift properties from finite words to infinite words. It will be first explicitly invoked, and then only implicitly used.
Observation 1. Let f : S * → T * be such that u v ⇒ f (u) f (v). Then f can be uniquely extended to S * ∪ S ω → T * ∪ T ω such that f (ρ ≤n ) f (ρ) for all n ∈ N and ρ ∈ S ω .
Games A game (with colors and states) is a tuple A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W such that A 1 and A 2 are non-empty sets (of actions for Player 1 and Player 2), Q is a non-empty set (of states), q 0 ∈ Q (is the initial state), δ : Q × A 1 × A 2 → Q (is the state update function). C is a non-empty set (of colors), col : Q × A 1 × A 2 → C (is a color trace), W ⊆ C ω (is the winning condition for Player 1)
Histories The full histories (full runs) of such a game are the finite (infinite) words over A 1 × A 2 , the Player 2 histories (Player 2 runs) are the finite (infinite) words over A 2 , and the Player 1 histories (Player 1 runs) are the finite (infinite) words over A 1 .
Strategies A Player 1 strategy is a function from A * 2 to A 1 . Informally, it requires Player 1 to remember exactly how Player 2 has played so far, and it tells Player 1 how to play.
Induced histories The function h is defined inductively below. As arguments it expects a strategy and a Player 2 history in A * 2 , and it returns a full history: the very full history that, morally, should happen if Player 1 followed the given strategy while Player 2 played the given Player 2 history. h
(s, ) := and h(s, β · b) := h(s, β) · (s(β), b).
By Observation 1 the function h is extended to expect opponents runs in A ω 2 and return full runs: h(s, β) is the only action run whose prefixes are the h(s, β ≤n ) for n ∈ N.
Winning strategies A Player 1 strategy s is winning if h(s, β) ∈ W for all β ∈ A ω 2 . If there is a Player 1 winning strategy in a game, one says that Player 1 wins the game. One-player games Intuitively, a one-player game (with colors and states) amounts to a game where Player 2 has only one strategy available, i.e. |A 2 | = 1. Formally, it is a tuple A 1 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W such that A 1 , Q, and C are non-empty sets, q 0 ∈ Q, δ : Q × A 1 → Q, col : Q × A 1 → C, and W ⊆ C ω . In this context, the full histories (full runs) of such a game are the finite (infinite) words over A 1 , and the Player 2 histories of Player 1 are the natural numbers (telling how many rounds have been played). There is only one Player 2 run, namely ω. Then, a Player 1 strategy is a function from N to A 1 , and the notation for the induced full histories is overloaded: h(s, 0) := and h(s, n + 1) := h(s, n) · s(n). By Observation 1 the function h is (again) extended: h(s, ω) is the only action run whose prefixes are the h(s, n) for n ∈ N. A Player 1 strategy s is winning if col • h(s, ω) ∈ W .
Prefix removal A set of infinite sequences is closed under prefix removal if the tails of the sequences from the set are again in the set. Formally, W ⊆ C ω is closed under prefix removal if the following holds:
Note that closeness under prefix removal is weaker than the prefix independence assumed in [6], [13], and [18] .
Interleaving Interleaving two infinite sequences consists in enumerating sequentially (part of) the two sequences to produce a new infinite sequence. For example, interleaving (2n) n∈N and (2n + 1) n∈N can produce the sequences (n) n∈N (perfect alternation), 1 · 0 · 3 · 5 · 2 · 7 · 4 · 6 · (n + 8) n∈N , and (2n) n∈N (by enumerating the first sequence only), but not the sequences (4n) n∈N or 0 · 1 · 4 · 3 . . . . Derived one-player games Let t be a Player 2 delayed response. The one-player game (col,δ) (q,a,A2) , the projection of t on the (q,
Delayed response Consider a game
is the game obtained by letting Player 2 fix his strategy (to realize) t in the sequentialized version of g. 
Main results
Section 3.1 characterizes the existence of Player 1 winning strategies and gives a complexity result. Section 3.2 defines additional concepts and uses the above characterization to characterize the existence of Player 2 everywhere-winning stochastic strategies. Section 3.3 studies the special case of one-state games and presents the semi-random determinacy.
Existence of Player 1 winning strategies
Theorem 2 below characterizes the existence of Player 1 winning strategies in a game via the existence of winning strategies in finitely many derived one-player games. Theorem 3 afterwards drops the assumption on closeness under prefix removal from Theorem 2, but at the cost of a universal quantification over the starting state of the game. In Theorems 2 and 3, the finiteness and the closeness assumptions are used only to prove the 2 ⇒ 1 implications. In games that are (or encode) turn-based games, the delayed responses are Player 2 positional strategies. So, restricting Theorems 2 and 3 to turn-based games yields Corollaries 4 and 5, respectively. Note that Corollary 4 generalizes Theorem 4 from [18] by only assuming closeness under prefix removal instead of prefix independence. This is significant since the safety condition is closed under interleaving and prefix removal, but is not prefix independent. The characterizations from Theorems 2 and 3 yields decidability results and rough algorithmic complexity estimates in Corollary 6 below. Note that checking all the possible strategies using memory size given by Theorems 2 and 3 would be slower than Corollary 6. 
Corollary 4. Consider a game
g = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col,Corollary 6. Let C = ∅, let W ⊆ C ω be
Existence of Player 2 almost surely winning random strategies
Consider a game A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W . Probability distribution A probability distribution on a finite set E is a function f : E → [0, 1] such that e∈E f (e) = 1. Let us call D(E) the set of the probability distributions on E.
Stochastic strategies A Player 2 stochastic strategy is a function τ :
Induced stochastic histories The function H is defined inductively below. As arguments it expects a Player 2 stochastic strategy τ and a Player 1 history α ∈ A * 1 , and it returns a probability distribution on (A 1 × A 2 ) |α| . Informally, it tells the probability of a full history if Player 1 plays α and Player 2 follows τ for |α| many rounds. Formally, H(τ, )( ) := 1, and
Induced probability measure The function H is extended to expect Player 1 runs:
Almost surely winning stochastic strategies A Player 2 stochastic strategy τ is said to be winning almost surely if λ(τ, α)(col −1 (W )) = 0 for all α ∈ A ω 1 . Factor-prefix completeness Informally, W is factor-prefix complete if the following holds: if the prefixes of an infinite sequence occur as factors arbitrarily far in the tail of a second sequence in W , the first sequence is also in W . (A factor, aka substring, is a subsequence of consecutive elements.) Formally, W ⊆ C ω is factor-prefix complete if the following holds:
In Theorem 7 below, a distribution is said to be positive if it assigns only positive masses. A (stochastic) strategy is said to be constant if it is a constant function, i.e. it returns always the same distribution, which is stronger than being Markovian, memoriless, or positional. 
Restricting Theorem 3 to stateless games yields a simpler Corollary 8 below. (Note that restricting Theorem 2 would yield a weaker variant of Corollary 8, i.e. additionally assuming closeness under prefix removal.) Memory size and algorithmic complexity estimates could be obtained essentially by replacing |Q| with 1 in Theorem 3 and Corollary 6.
Corollary 8. Consider a game
The following are equivalents. 1. Player 1 has a winning strategy (resp. finite-memory winning strategy).
, where reg C are the regular infinite sequences over C.
Restricting Theorem 7 to stateless games cancels the universal quantification over states, but an even stronger version can be obtained: finiteness of A 1 and prefix removal closeness are dropped, and the assumption on factor-prefix completeness is weaken into factor-set completeness, as below.
Factor-set completeness A language of infinite sequences is called factor-set complete if the following holds: if a sequence in the language has factors of unbounded length over some C 0 , the language has a sequence over C 0 . This is formally defined by contraposition:
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Concurrent games and semi-random determinacy
Observation 9. Factor-prefix completeness implies factor-set completeness (finite alphabets). 
4
The proofs Theorems 2 and 3 characterize a concurrent game by finitely many one-player games. A natural idea would be to split their proof into two parts: first, reduce the problem to turn-based games via the well-known observation that a player has a winning strategy in a concurrent game iff she has one in the sequential version of the game where she plays first; second, use similar techniques as in [18] . For this to work, the sequential versions of the concurrent games must allow for colorless transitions, or a fresh color should be used for the transitions where Player 1 plays. This raises three issues: first, true colors should occur infinitely often in every run in these turn-based games, which would require a more complex notion of turn-based game; second, the winning condition should be rephrased to take the fresh color into account, and so should its closeness properties; third, it would be much difficult to obtain stronger results for the one-state concurrent games, since the one-state property may be hard to track through the translation into turn-based games. Instead, this article overcomes the concurrency directly thanks to Lemma 11.
Lemma 11. Let (X i ) i∈I be a family of sets. Then
Proof. Towards a contradiction, let us assume the negation of the claim, i.e. ∃f :
Consider the one-state game g in Figure 2 (to the left), where each cell encloses one vector of the real plane. Player 1's objective is that the sum of the outcome vectors remains bounded, which is closed under interleaving and prefix removal, so g is a concurrent version of the Minkowski games [24] . There are 2 3 = 8 delayed responses, and five of the corresponding one-player games g 0 , . . . g 7 are displayed to the right in Figure 2 . Player 1 wins g 0 , . . . , g 7 , since for each i ≤ 7 the vector (0, 0) is in the convex hull of the three vectors defining g j . The idea is to let Player 1 play g as if she were playing g 0 , . . . , g 7 in parallel, more specifically in an interleaved way. Then, summing up the eight bounded trajectories yields a bounded trajectory for g.
The main difficulty to play the g 0 , . . . , g 7 in an interleaved way is that at every stage, Player 1 should pick an action such that whichever action Player 2 chooses, the resulting vector is exactly the expected one by the (fixed) winning strategy for some g j . Let f : {1, 2} 3 → {a 1 , . . . , a 3 } be the function that tells which action should be played currently in each of the 2 3 = 8 one-player games. By Lemma 11 there exists an action a i such that the following holds: if Player 2 chooses b 1 , there exists g j expecting the vector in the cell (a i , b 1 ), and likewise if Player 2 chooses b 2 , there exists g k expecting the vector in the cell (a i , b 2 ).
Figure 2 A concurrent Minkowski game and its derived games
Let us now quickly mention semi-random determinacy. The proof of Theorem 7 below uses similar techniques as, e.g., a proof in the submitted journal version of [24] .
Proof of 1 ⇒ 3 from Theorem 7. Let p ∈]0, 1 |A2| ] and let τ be a Player 2 stochastic strategy that always assigns probability at least p to every action.
For all q ∈ Q, by contraposition of Theorem 2 let t q be a delayed response (in g q ) such that Player 1 loses the one-player game g q (t q ). For all n ∈ N, anytime a play reaches the state q, the probability that from then on Player 2 follows t q for n rounds in a row, as if second-guessing Player 1, is greater than or equal to p n . Consider a play where Player 2 follows τ . Let q be a state that is visited infinitely often. (Such a state exists since Q is finite.) Thanks to the argument above, for all n ∈ N, the probability that, at some point, Player 2 follows t q for n rounds in a row from q on is one. Since the countable intersection of measure-one sets has also measure one, the probability that, for all n ∈ N, at some point Player 2 follows t q for n rounds in a row from q on is one.
Let (ρ n ) n∈N be the corresponding full histories. Since A 1 and A 2 are finite, the tree induced by prefix closure of the (ρ n ) n∈N is finitely branching, so by Koenig's Lemma it has an infinite path ρ, which corresponds to Player 2 following t q infinitely many rounds in a row. So col(ρ) / ∈ W . By factor-prefix closeness the original play is also losing for Player 1, i.e. winning for Player 2.
Applications
Abstract assumptions need not only be general, they also need to be practical. Section 5.1 shows that the closeness and completeness axioms enjoy nice algebraic properties: individually, w.r.t. Boolean combination, as well as collectively via the derived closure or completion operators. Section 5.2 mentions several classical or recent winning conditions from computer science and tells which of them satisfy the closeness and completeness axioms. Section 5.3 introduces the notion of bounded residual load as an alternative to the finitary fairness [2] , and uses it to define a finitary variant of the ω-regular languages that satisfies the closeness and completeness axioms.
Algebraic properties of the closeness and completeness axioms
Lemma 12 below shows how the axioms behave w.r.t. Boolean combination.
Lemma 12. 1. The set of the factor-set complete languages is closed under union.
The set of the interleaving-closed languages is closed under intersection.

The set of the factor-prefix complete languages is closed under intersection and union.
The set of the interleaving-closed languages is not closed under union: {0 ω } and {1 ω } are closed under interleaving (and by prefix removal), but {0 ω , 1 ω } is not. The set of the interleaving-closed languages is not closed under complementation: the interleaving of two infinite sequences that are not eventually constant is not eventually constant, but interleaving the eventually constant sequences 0 ω and 1 ω may yield (01) ω . The set of the factor-set complete languages is not closed under intersection: indeed, both two-element sets {0 (12)0(12) 2 0(12) 3 0 . . . , (12) ω } and {0 (12)0(12) 2 0 . . . , (112) ω } are factor-set complete, but their intersection {0 (12)0(12) 2 0 . . . } is not. The set of the factor-set (-prefix) complete languages is not closed under complementation:
The closeness under interleaving and prefix removal, and the factor-prefix completeness induce closure operators. If a relevant winning condition fails to satisfy an equaly relevant axiom, such an operator conveniently constructs a (more generous, axiom satisfying) variant of the winning condition. The closure by prefix removal of a set consists in adding the tails of the sequences from the set; the closure by interleaving consists in adding sequences obtained by interleaving the sequences from the set; and the factor-prefix completion consists in adding the sequences whose prefixes occur arbitrarily far in a sequence from the set. Note that factor-set completeness does not induce a canonical closure operator due to the existential quantifier in its definition.
Lemma 13 below shows that the operators behave as expected. This is not for granted in general, as one may need to perform the addition operation an ordinal number of times. Here, one step suffices, which is convenient if computation is of concern. 
Concrete winning conditions
The non-comprehensive list below displays classical or recent winning conditions from computer science. It especially shows that new winning conditions obtained by conjunction of older winning conditions have been recently studied, e.g. in [7] and [4] .
Parity C := {0, 1, . . . n} for some n ∈ N. A sequence is winning iff the least number occurring infinitely many times in the sequence is even.
Muller C := {0, 1, . . . n} for some n ∈ N. Let M ⊆ P(C) be a set of subsets of C. A sequence is winning iff the numbers occurring infinitely many times in the sequence constitute a set in M .
Mean-payoff C = R, and a sequence is winning iff the limit superior of the partial sums is non-negative: (u n ) n∈N ∈ R N is winning iff lim sup n→∞ 1 n n i=0 u n ≥ 0. (Variants exist with limit inferior or positivity instead of non-negativity.)
Energy C = R, and a sequence is winning iff its partial sums are non-negative:
, and a sequence is winning iff its partial sums are uniformly bounded:
. . n} for some n ∈ N. The winning condition is the conjunction of the energy (first component) and the parity (second component) conditions.
Average energy [4] C = R. The objective is to maintain a non-negative energy while keeping the average level of energy below a threshold t ∈ R: a sequence (u n ) n∈N ∈ R N is winning iff (∀n ∈ N,
Observation 15. 1. The parity, mean-payoff, energy, boundedness, energy-parity, and average energy conditions are all closed under interleaving. (It uses Lemma 12.2 to deals with energy-parity and average energy.) 2. The Muller and discounted sum conditions are not closed under interleaving. 3. The boundedness condition is factor-prefix complete; the others are not. 4. The energy, energy-parity, and discounted sum conditions are not closed under prefix removal; the others are. 
Bounded residual load
Unlike Theorems 2 and 3, Theorems 7 and 10 are not likely to be extended to include ω-regular languages. Before defining a variant of the ω-regular languages that satisfies the closeness and completeness properties from this article, let us consider notions of fairness that can be defined via a predicate S on N × N × C ω . Intuitivily S(n, d, γ) is supposed to mean that the sequence γ has satisfied, with delay at most d, a request that was formulated in γ at time n.
There are several reasonable ways to express the good behavior of an infinite sequence using the S (n, d, γ) . The classical definition of fairness requires that all problems be eventually solved (see F below), or cofinitely many problems (see F CI below), for a usual weakening that ensures prefix independence of the condition. Arguing that this kind of fairness gives no guarantee about response time, [11] strengthened fairness into finitary fairness, which requires the existence of a uniform bound on the waiting time (see F F below).
Yet another variant, bounded residual load (BRL), is introduced below. It says that γ ∈ C ω satisfies S wrt bounded residual load, if the number of problems that have currently not yet been solved is uniformly bounded overtime.
3. F and BRL are incomparable in general.
The finitary fairness and the like may be too strict for some applications: gladly accepting to wait b time units, but categorically refusing to wait b + 1 time units sounds unusual indeed. Instead, the system (which is responsible for solving the problems) could pay a penalty for each problem spending each time unit unsolved. Thanks to the bounded residual load, one has then the guarantee that the amount of money to be paid per time unit is bounded.
It is possible to combine the two ideas, though: by setting an acceptable response time and an acceptable uniform bound on the number of missed deadlines. This however, turns out to be equivalent to the simple BRL, which argues for the robustness of the concept.
A second justification for the BRL is that it has nice properties that the other notions of fairness lack when S(n, d, γ) is defined to minic ω-regular languages, as shown below. Consider a non-empty set C of colors and a function C : C → P(C * ). A sequence γ ∈ C ω is said to satisfy C from position n after delay d, denoted S C (n, d, γ), if the following holds.
Intuitively, each color is a problem or a request, and the problem may be solved in several ways, each way consisting in enumerating suitable colors quickly. (This might very well correspond to the positive fragment of some bounded-time temporal logic.) To simulate the parity condition, one can set C := N and C(2n) := {{k} | k ∈ N} and C(2n + 1) := {{2k} | k ∈ N ∧ k ≤ n} for all n ∈ N. The corresponding BRL C is the parity condition with bounded residual load. Lemma 20 below says that however C may be instantiated, all Theorems 2, 3, 7, and 10 can be applied with the BRL C winning condition.
Lemma 20. For every non-empty set C of colors and every function C : C → P(N C ), the winning condition BRL C is closed under prefix removal and interleaving, and factor-prefix complete.
Even when C simulates the parity condition as above, none of the corresponding F C , F CI C , or F F C is both closed under interleaving and factor-set complete. F F C is not closed under interleaving: 
A Existence of Player 1 winning strategies
A.1 More on interleaving
Interleaving two finite word consists in enumerating sequentially the two words to produce a new word. For example, interleaving 024 and 13 can produce the words 01234 and 10324, but neither 31024 nor 01432. Formally, interleaving finite words over some alphabet C is defined by induction: for all γ, γ , γ ∈ C * and c ∈ C, set ∈ I(γ, γ ) and γ ∈ I(γ, γ ) ⇒ γ c ∈ I(γc, γ ) ∩ I(γ, γ c).
Observation 21. Interleaving finite words is associative and commutative.
Let us now give a possible formalization of the interleaving of infinite words. Let Proof. Let us first assume that γ ∈ I(γ 1 , . . . , γ k ), and let us prove by induction on n ∈ N that γ <n ∈ I(γ
definition of the interleaving of infinite words. By I.H γ <n
) by definition of interleaving of finite words.
Conversely, let us assume that for all n ∈ N there exists (γ i ) i≤k such that γ i γ i for all i ≤ k and γ <n can be obtained by interleaving the γ i .
A.2 More on Lemma 11
Below is a short story that might help provide useful insight to some readers. Once upon a time, there was a capricious king who loved pastry. There were many bakeries in his kingdom, and each of them could bake a wide range of delicious cakes. Each shop would bake only one type of cake per day, though, and the only way to know which was to visit the shop. One morning, the king summoned his minister to bring him his favorite cake for dinner (among the cakes of the day). Unfortunately, the shops were far apart and one could only visit one of them within a day, and the king's favorite depended on the cakes of the day in an irrational way. The minister considered buying a cake from some shop and lying about the cakes of the day in the other shops. But the king knew the range of each shop, what if there were no plausible lie? Desperate, the minister sought help from a mathematician: she enquired about the king's preferences and the range of each shop, bought a cake from one shop, lied about the cakes of the day, and the king ate happily. Lemma 11 shows that the mathematician was bound to succeed: given the ranges of the shops and the king's preferences, there always exists a safe shop. T Corollary 23 below is derived from Lemma 11 by partial Skolemization, i.e. by pulling the ∃i before the ∀f , and the ∃u before the ∀j, thus automatically yielding the ∃F and the ∃G f , C V I T 2 0 1 6
23:16
Concurrent games and semi-random determinacy respectively. Whereas Lemma 11 could be invoked to characterize the existence of winning strategies, Corollary 23 will be invoked to characterize the existence of winning strategies with (finite) memory, which will be constructed via the functions F and G f . Note that in the statement of Corollary 23 uses natural numbers as von Neumann ordinals.
A.3 Using Lemma 11
Lemma 11 is then used in Lemma 26 which factors out most of the proof burden of Theorems 2 and 3. Lemma 26 involves games that are concurrent at fewer states than in the original game, and then the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 proceed by induction on the degree of concurrency. To define these simpler games, consider g = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W .
States involving a player A state q ∈ Q is said to involve Player 2 if 1 < |(col, δ)(q, a, A 2 )| for some a ∈ A 1 . Indeed, if 1 = |(col, δ)(q, a, A 2 )| for all a ∈ A 1 , at state q the action chosen by Player 2 is irrelevant to the produced color and next state.
Delayed q-responses Let q ∈ Q. Informally, a delayed q-response is a partial delayed response only defined at state q. Formally, let E 1 , . . . , E k be the elements of
q-derived games Let q ∈ Q and let e be a delayed q-response e in g. Informally, g(q, e) is a game derived from g by modifying the local interaction at state q, such that the resulting game, called a q-derived game, is a mix between g and some derived game of g. Formally,
Lemma 24 may sound a bit technical, partly because it is meant to be used in two slightly different contexts. It is used once to prove the 2 ⇒1 implication of Theorem 2, where F (q, a) (used in Lemma 24) is the full set A 2 ; and it is also used in the proof of Lemma 25, where the F (q, a) are singletons. Then Lemma 25 is used to prove the 1 ⇒2 implication of Theorem 2 and the 1 ⇒2 implication of Theorem 3.
Lemma 24. Consider a game g q0 = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W . Let t be a delayed response in g q0 , and let F : Q × A 1 → P(A 2 ) be such that (col, δ)(q, a, F (q, a)) = {t q, (col,δ) (q,a,A2) } for all (q, a) ∈ Q × A 1 . Let s be a Player 1 strategy in g q0 , let β ∈ A ω 2 be such that β n ∈ F (∆ • h(s, β <n ), s(β <n )) for all n ∈ N, and let s t be the Player 1 strategy in g q0 (t) such that (col,δ) (q,a,A2) } by assumption on F , and (col t , δ t )(q, a) = t q, (col,δ) (q,a,A2) by definition of g q0 (t), so
Proof. For all (q, a)
Intuitively, Equation (1) suggests that Player 2 can simulate g q0 (t) in g q0 by always guessing which action Player 1 is going to choose and then by choosing his own action accordingly, i.e. via F . To give a formal content to this intuition, let us first prove that the sequences of the visited states are the same in the two games, if Player 2 follows β in g q0 . More specifically, let us prove the following by induction on n.
For the base case,
) by definition of h, thus completing the induction.
Next, let us prove that the sequences of produced colors are the same in the two games, if Player 2 follows β in g q0 . More specifically, let us also prove the following by induction on n.
For the base case, Proof. Let q 0 ∈ Q and t be a delayed response in g q0 . By definition of the delayed responses, t q, (col,δ) (q,a,A2) ∈ (col, δ)(q, a, A 2 ) for all (q, a) ∈ Q × A 1 , so by the axiom of choice there exists a function f : Q × A 1 → A 2 such that (col, δ)(q, a, f (q, a)) = t q, (col,δ) (q,a,A2) for all (q, a) ∈ Q × A 1 .
Let s be a Player 1 winning strategy in g q0 , and let β ∈ A ω 2 be defined by β n := f (∆ • h(s, β <n ), s(β <n )). Let a Player 1 strategy s t in g q0 (t) be defined by s t (n) := s(β <n ) for all n ∈ N.
Invoking Lemma 24 with F (q, a) : Proof of Lemma 26. Sketch Consider the game g played almost like g q0 , but the rounds played at the state q 1 are no longer concurrent, they are split into two subrounds: in the first subround Player 2 chooses some delayed q 1 -response e; in the second subround Player 1 chooses some projection e i thereof, thus producing a color and inducing the next state. Player 1 can win this game by pretending that she is playing some q-derived games (the ones from the statement of Lemma 26) in an interleaved way: Player 2 is choosing the interleaving order by switching (or not) games when at state q 1 , and Player 1 resumes the play of the relevant game where it was last interrupted. Since W is interleaving-closed and the run in g is obtained by interleaving runs from q-derived games all won by Player 1, the induced run is also in W .
For Player 1, playing g q0 amounts to playing g with a significant handicap: she may no longer know what Player 2 is choosing at state q 1 , i.e. if the current state is q 1 , she may not know which q-derived game she is supposed to play. When at q 1 , the best she can hope for is to determine some a ∈ A 1 such that, regardless of which b ∈ A 2 Player 2 may choose, (col, δ) (q, a, b) are the very color and next state that are expected in order to proceed with the play of some underlying q-derived game. The existence of a suitable a ∈ A 1 follows from Lemma 11/Corollary 23.
Details Let E 1 , . . . , E k be the elements of the set {(col, δ)(q 1 , a, A 2 ) | a ∈ A 1 }, so e 1 ∈ E 1 × · · · × E k . By assumption, let s e 1 be a Player 1 winning strategy in g q0 (q 1 , e 1 ), and for all e ∈ (E 1 × · · · × E k ) \ {e 1 }, let s e be a Player 1 winning strategy in g q1 (q 1 , e). For all i ≤ k let a i be such that (col, δ)(q 1 , a i , A 2 ) = E i . So, for all delayed q 1 -response e and all a ∈ A 1 , there exists i ≤ k such that (col , δ )(q 1 , a i , A 2 ) = e i = (col , δ )(q 1 , a, A 2 ) (where g q0 (q 1 , e) = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q, δ , C, col , W ). Informally, whichever simpler game g q0 (q 1 , e) is being played, for any action a ∈ A 1 at state q 1 , there is some a i that has the same effect. So wlog let us assume that the s e only prescribe actions in {a 1 , . . . , a k } when at state q 1 .
Let M be a set with cardinality |M | = 2 r , let and m 0 ∈ M . By assumption, for all e ∈ E 1 × · · · × E k the strategy s e can be represented as follows: σ e : Q × M → A 1 and µ e : Q × M × A 2 → M such that s e (β) = σ e (q e (β), m e (β)), where m e and q e are defined by mutual induction below. m e ( ) := m 0 and q e 1 ( ) := q 0 and q e ( ) := q 1 for all e = e 1 m e (βb) := µ e (q e (β), m e (β), b) and q e (βb) := δ(q e (β), σ e (q e (β), m e (β)), b)
A Player 1 strategy is built as follows. 
Claim 4 below says that if the current "simpler game" has just changed, the previous state must have been q 1 . Claim 5 below says that if the previous state was q 1 , the current "simpler game" can be expressed using d. Claim 5 below says that if the current state was q 1 , the action that Player 1 has just chosen in the compound game is the same as the action that Player 1 would have chosen in the current "simpler game" under similar memory environment. By inspecting the above definitions of m and µ, one can show Claims 4 and 5 below for all β ∈ A * 2 and b ∈ A 2 .
m(βb)(G)
Claim 6 requires a proof: for all β ∈ A * 
since ι is injective and q(β) = q 1 by assumption, and Claim 6 is proved. By definition, proving that the Player 1 strategy σ • (q, m) is winning amounts to proving that col • h(σ • (q, m), β) ∈ W for all Player 2 runs β ∈ A ω 2 . This will be done by proving that all β ∈ A * 2 can be decomposed into (β e ) e∈E1×···×E k such that col • h(σ • (q, m), β) can be obtained by interleaving the col • h(σ e circ(q e , m e ), β e ). The decomposition of the Player 2 history is done by induction: for all β ∈ A * 2 , all b ∈ A 2 , and all e ∈ (E 1 × · · · × E k )
(βb)(G)
Claim 7 says that the compound memory stores the memory contents related to each simpler game. Claim 8 says that the current state in the compound game is equal to the C V I T 2 0 1 6 23:20 Concurrent games and semi-random determinacy current state in the current simpler game. Claim 9 says that the current state in the simpler games on stand-by is q 1 . ∀β ∈ A *
Claims 7,8,9 are proved by mutual induction on β. Base case, β = .
and q e ( e ) = q e ( ) = q 1 .
For the inductive case let β ∈ A * 2 , b ∈ A 2 , and e ∈ E 1 × · · · × E k . To prove Claim 7, let us make a case disjunction. = m e ((βb) e ) since β e b = (βb) e as mentioned above.
Claim 8. Let e := m(βb)(G).
To prove that q e ((βb) e ) = q(βb), let us also make a case disjunction. First case, q(β) = q 1 , so m(βb)(G) = m(β)(G) by Claim 4. Observation 27. For every game g = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W , state q ∈ Q involving Player 2, and delayed q-response e, the following holds.
1. Player 2 involves one state less (i.e. q) in g(q, e) than in g.
2.
Every delayed response t in g(q, e) is also a delayed response in g, and t q = e and g(q, e)(t) = g(t).
Proof. 1. With g(q, e)
Lemma 28 below shows that the trace behaves nicely w.r.t. the "sub-strategies". h(s, β ) , and let a Player 1 strategy s q be defined by 
Lemma 28. Consider games
by definition of h, thus completing the induction.
Let us now prove the following by induction on β.
Claim (12) is lifted to infinite arguments: Proof of Theorem 2. 1 ⇒2 by Lemma 25.
Sketch of 2 ⇒1
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of states that involve Player 2. For the base case, morally "g q0 = g q0 (t)" for all delayed responses t. For the inductive case, let a state q 1 involve Player 2. In the games g q0 (q 1 , e) , where e is a delayed q 1 -response, fewer states involve Player 2, so the I.H. yields corresponding winning strategies. If one of these strategies avoids q 1 , it wins also in g q0 . Otherwise, each of these strategies has a "substrategy" that wins g q1 (q 1 , e), by closeness under prefix removal. Lemma 26 is invoked to complete the induction.
Details of 2 ⇒1 The proof proceeds by induction on the number of states that involve Player 2. For the base case, let us assume that no state involves Player 2. Especially, (col, δ)(q, a, A 2 ) = {t q, (col,δ) (q,a,A2) } for all (q, a) ∈ Q × A 1 since |(col, δ)(q, a, A 2 )| = 1 by base-case assumption and t q,(col,δ)(q,a,A2) ∈ (col, δ)(q, a, A 2 ) by definition of a delayed response. Let s t be a Player 1 winning strategy in g q0 (t), and let us define a Player 1 strategy s in g q0 by s(β) := s t (|β|) for all β ∈ A * 2 . Let β ∈ A ω 2 . Invoking Lemma 24 with F (q, a) := A 2 yields col t • h t (s t , ω) = col • h(s, β). Since β is arbitrary and s t is winning, s is winning in g q0 .
For the inductive case, let q 1 ∈ Q be a state involving Player 2. For all delayed q 1 -responses e, fewer states involve Player 2 in g q0 (q 1 , e) than in g q0 , by Observation 27.1. By Observation 27.2, for all delayed q 1 -responses e, every delayed responses t in g q0 (q 1 , e) is also a delayed response in g q0 , and t q1 = e and g q0 (q 1 , e)(t) = g q0 (t); by assumption Player 1 wins g q0 (t) for all delayed responses t in g q0 , so Player 1 wins g q0 (t) = g q0 (q 1 , e)(t) for all delayed responses t in g q0 (q 1 , e); by I.H. let s e be a Player 1 winning (finite memory) strategy in g q0 (q 1 , e).
Let us make a case disjunction on whether some s e avoids q 1 (starting from q 0 ), i.e. ∆ q0 • h(s e , β) = q 1 for all β ∈ A * 2 . First case, there exists such an s e , which is also a Player 1 winning (finite memory) strategy in g q0 as proved below. Recall that g q0 (q 1 , e) = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ , C, col , W , where for all (a, b, q (q, a, b) and (col , δ )(q 1 , a, b) = e (col,δ)(q1,a,A2) . Let us prove the following by induction on β. 
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Concurrent games and semi-random determinacy Let us now prove the following by induction on β.
For the base case col • h(s e , ) = = col • h(s e , ). For the inductive case let β ∈ A * 2 and b ∈ A 2 . Then Proof of Theorem 3. 1 ⇒2 by Lemma 25 2 ⇒1 Let q 0 ∈ Q. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of states that involve Player 2. The base case is verbatim like the base case from the proof of Theorem 2. For the inductive case (similar but simpler), let q 1 ∈ Q be a state involving Player 2. For all delayed q 1 -responses e, fewer states involve Player 2 in g q0 (q 1 , e) and g q1 (q 1 , e) than in g q0 , by Observation 27.1. By Observation 27.2, for all delayed q 1 -responses e, every delayed responses t in g qi (q 1 , e), where i ∈ {0, 1}, is also a delayed response in g qi , and t q1 = e and g qi (q 1 , e)(t) = g qi (t); by assumption Player 1 wins g qi (t) for all delayed responses t in g qi , so Player 1 wins g qi (t) = g qi (q 1 , e)(t) for all delayed responses t in g qi (q 1 , e) Proof of Corollary 6. By invoking the characterization from Theorem 2 (resp. Theorem 3). For all q ∈ Q, the (col, δ)(q, a, A 2 ) are subsets of C ×Q, so they have cardinality at most C ×Q and there are at most 2 |C||Q| many of them. So, for all q ∈ Q there are at most (|C||Q|) (2 |C||Q| ) delayed q-responses, and there are at most (|C||Q|) ] and let τ be a Player 2 stochastic strategy that always assigns probability at least p to every action.
C
The special case of stateless (i.e. one-state) games
Proof of Observation 9. Let C be finite and W ⊆ C ω be factor-prefix complete. Let C 0 ⊆ C and let γ ∈ W have factors in C * 0 of arbitrary length. So γ has factors in C * 0 of arbitrary length and also occurring arbitrarily far in the tail. So by finiteness of C 0 , for all n ∈ N there exists a word in C n 0 that occurs as factor arbitrarily far in the tail of γ. The set induced by the prefix closure of these words is a finitely-branching tree, so by Koenig's Lemma it has an infinite path γ ∈ C ω 0 . By construction the prefixes of γ occur as factors arbitrarily far in the tail of γ ∈ W , so γ ∈ W by factor-prefix completeness. This γ ∈ W ∩ C ω 0 witnesses factor-set completeness. Let the full-support Markovian strategy used by Player 2 be defined by a probability distribution p : A 2 → R, where 0 < p(b) for all b ∈ A 2 . At an arbitrary stage of the interaction let p : A 1 → R be the probability distribution from which Player 1 draws her next action X. Let Y be the independent random variable for the action of Player 2. So, starting from any stage of the interaction, the probability that the procuded color is in C 0 for n times in a row is at least (min b∈A2 p(b)) n . In particular it is positive and independent of the starting stage. Therefore, the probability that the procuded color is in C 0 n times in a row somewhere in the run is 1. Since a countable union of sets of measure zero also has measure zero, the probability that a run has factors in C * 0 of arbitrary length is also 1. By the assumed factor-set completeness, if the run has factors in C * 0 of arbitrary length the run is not in W . This shows that the probability that the run is in W is 0.
D Applications
Proof of Lemma 12. 1. Let (W i ) i∈I be factor-set complete languages, let W := ∪ i∈I W i , let C 0 be set, let ρ ∈ W have factors of unbounded length over C 0 . ρ ∈ W i for some i ∈ I, so W i ∩ C ω 0 = ∅ by factor-set completeness of W i , so W ∩ C ω 0 = ∅. 2. Let (W i ) i∈I be interleaving closed languages, and let W := ∩ i∈I W i . Let ρ, ρ ∈ W and let ρ be obtained by interleaving of ρ and ρ. For all i ∈ I, ρ, ρ ∈ W i , so ρ ∈ W i by interleving closeness of W i . Therefore ρ ∈ W . 3. Let (W i ) i∈I be factor-prefix complete languages, let W := ∩ i∈I W i (resp. W := ∪ i∈I W i ), let ρ ∈ W , and let the prefixes of some ρ occur arbitrarily far in the tail of ρ. By factor-prefix completeness of each W i , ρ belongs to each W i , i.e. to W . (resp. ρ ∈ W i for some i ∈ I, so ρ ∈ W i , so by factor-prefix completeness of W i , so ρ ∈ W .)
Proof of lemma 14. 1. Let W be closed under interleaving, let γγ, γγ ∈ W , and let γ (2) be obtained by interleaving γ and γ. So γγγ (2) can be obtained by interleaving γγ and γγ, so it is in W . 2. Let W be factor-prefix complete and let γγ ∈ W . Let the prefixes of some γ occur arbitrarily far in the tail of γ. These prefixes occur also arbitrarily far in the tail of γ · γ, so γ W by factor-prefix completeness. Let W be factor-set complete and let γγ ∈ W . Let C 0 and let us assume that γ has factors over C 0 of arbitrary length. So does γγ, so there exists γ ∈ W ∩ C ω 0 by factor-set completeness.
